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SEUNG-YOUN OH

How China Outsmarts WTO Rulings
in the Wind Industry
ABSTRACT

Through a study of China’s wind turbine sector, this paper demonstrates how China
liberally implements industrial policies and then removes them when the WTO
disputes them. China’s convenient compliance with the WTO rulings reflects Beijing’s realpolitik navigation through the organization’s dispute-resolution process,
rather than socialization to international norms.
K E Y W O R D S : China’s industrial policy, World Trade Organization, wind energy,
trade dispute, multinational companies

F ACED WITH THE NEED FOR GREATER energy independence and environmental protection, governments in both developed and developing countries
have invested heavily in clean energy technology. The global ﬁnancial crisis of
2008–2009 has further prompted countries to increase their promotion of the
green energy industry as a new driver of industrial upgrades and job creation.
Among renewable energy sources, wind energy has gained a prominent position with its advanced technology, potentially low cost, and convenience for
large-scale commercial development. In recent years, China has developed
wind energy capacity at a speed that has blown away many pundits and
industry actors. Beginning as a country with only 1 gigawatt (GW) of capacity
from wind towers in 2005, China surpassed the United States in 2010 to boast
the world’s largest installed capacity of wind-generated power. China’s rapid
ascent as a global wind power has been accompanied by a parallel rise of
Chinese wind turbine producers in domestic and global markets.

S EUNG -Y OUN O H is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Bryn Mawr College, Pennsylvania,
USA. She wishes to thank the Center for Social Sciences at Bryn Mawr College, the Center for the
Study of Contemporary China at the University of Pennsylvania, and an anonymous reviewer for
their help in preparing this article. Email: <soh03@brynmawr.edu>.
Asian Survey, Vol. 55, Number 6, pp. 1116–1145. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2015
by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission
to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Reprints and
Permissions web page, http://www.ucpress.edu/journals.php?p¼reprints. DOI: 10.1525/AS.2015.55.6.1116.

1116

OH / HOW CHINA OUTSMARTS THE WTO  1117

China’s breathtaking coming of age as a global wind power has ignited
debates over the effectiveness of industrial policy, as well as the role of state
and international institutions, in creating a competitive market and regulatory environment. Implementing various industrial policies is certainly nothing new in developing renewable energy, especially in terms of encouraging
domestic producers to capture market share. However, China has employed
extensive and integrated industrial policies across the demand and supply
sides of the market, which in turn have escalated trade tensions with other
countries in recent years. Foreign trade representatives and businesses are
increasingly concerned about their diminishing access to the Chinese wind
turbine market, as well as about having to compete with inexpensive Chinese
products in global markets. Thus, China’s rapid success in renewable technology adoption raises the following questions: (1) What are the driving
forces behind China’s rise as a global wind power? (2) How do state policies
and markets interact at the international, national, and sub-national levels?
(3) What does this story tell us about the ability of late developers to catch up
with earlier developers, especially under the liberalizing and socializing pressures of the World Trade Organization (WTO)?
This article examines such questions by evaluating a case study of multilateral and bilateral trade disputes between the US and China over China’s
industrial policy measures in the wind turbine industry. In doing so, it
challenges conventional wisdom on three points. First, I argue that China’s
compliance with WTO rulings reﬂects Beijing’s realpolitik and skillful navigation through the mineﬁeld of the WTO’s dispute-resolution process,
rather than socialization to international norms. Second, contrary to expectations of multinational companies (MNCs) functioning as export-lobbying
groups to push for economic liberalization in China, the development of
a global supply chain complicates domestic political calculations among foreign business groups due to their economic and trade relationships with
China. Lastly, the use of industrial policy does not come without substantial
costs. State-led industry development not only distorts market incentives by
favoring quantitative growth at the expense of quality, but also leads to
market fragmentation with widespread overcapacity.
This article begins by introducing the empirical puzzle of China’s rise as
a strong player in the wind power industry, and providing a literature review
on the WTO’s and MNCs’ impact on socializing and liberalizing China.
I then introduce my argument regarding how China crafts its protective
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industrial policies in such a way as to stay ahead of WTO enforcement, which
I demonstrate through a case study of trade disputes in the wind turbine sector.
The ﬁnal section discusses the negative implications of China’s heavy use of
industrial policies that forestall sustainable long-term growth in the sector.
Thus, this research extends its contributions beyond the scope of the wind
turbine industry by demonstrating how China’s pattern of developing its own
national champions through industrial policies occurs in many different sectors. The paper also raises important systemic issues for sustaining economic
growth—not only for China, but also for other large transitional economies.

EMPIRICAL PUZZLE: CHINA’S ASTRONOMIC RISE AS A GLOBAL
WIND POWER

Renewable energy has steadily captivated Chinese policymakers’ attention in
recent years as a way to diversify energy resources, mitigate environmental
problems, and encourage industrial upgrades. Decades of reliance on laborintensive and energy-inefﬁcient sectors has taken a mounting environmental
toll in the country, leading to increased pollution, carbon emissions, and
energy usage. Between 2001 and 2011, Chinese energy consumption grew by
136%,1 and in 2008, China obtained 90% of its energy from highly polluting
energy sources such as coal and oil (Figure 1). China’s dependence on exportoriented economic production contributes to the problem, as this production is
more energy-intensive than the rest of the economy.2 Thus, the development
of renewable energy is consistent with Beijing’s emphasis on the sustainability
of China’s economic model and industrial upgrades through developing highvalue-added and technology-intensive industries. The China Greentech Initiative identiﬁes key sectors to be developed, including renewable energy.3 The
country’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) set a target to increase non–fossil fuel
energy sources from 8.3% in 2010 to 11.4% of total energy use.4
1. ‘‘A Greener Shade of Grey: A Special Report on Renewable Energy in China,’’ Economist
Intelligence Unit, The Economist, May 2012.
2. Kahrl Fredrich and David Roland-Holst, ‘‘Growth and Structural Change in China’s Energy
Economy,’’ Energy 34:7 (2009), pp. 894–903.
3. China Greentech Initiative, The China Greentech Report 2009, <http://www.china-greentech.
com/2009report>.
4. KPMG, ‘‘China’s 12th Five-Year Plan: Energy,’’ April 2011, <http://www.kpmg.com/cn/en/
IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/China-12th-Five-Year-Plan-Energy-201104.
pdf>, accessed November 11, 2012.
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figure 1 a. China’s Energy Consumption Growth (1998–2010) (in million tonnes oil equivalent)

figure 1 b. Energy Consumption by Type in 2008

S O U R C E : Compiled from BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy and US Energy Information
Administration, China Country Analysis, 2008.

Among renewable energy sources, wind energy has drawn government
attention for its low cost of development and contribution to industrial
capacity-building. Proactive government support and strong domestic
demand have driven explosive growth of the wind turbine manufacturing
industry since 2005, an industry that barely existed previously (Figure 2). By
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figure 2. China’s Annual and Cumulative Wind Installation (2001–2011)

Junfeng Li, Pengfei Shi, and Gao Hu, China Wind Power Outlook 2010, China Renewable Energy
Industries Association, Global Wind Energy Council, Greenpeace, October 2010, p. 2, <http://www.
greenpeace.org/eastasia/Global/eastasia/publications/reports/climate-energy/2010/2010-china-wind-poweroutlook.pdf>.

SOURCE :

2010, China had established itself as the country with the world’s largest
amount of installed wind-power capacity,5 which accounted for 36% and
43% of the growth in the global annual wind turbine production market
in 2011 and 2012, respectively. It also possessed 26.8% of all global wind power
capacity in 2012 (Figure 3).
China’s rapid ascent as a world wind power has been accompanied by the
parallel rise of Chinese wind turbine producers. The country installed its ﬁrst
imported utility-scale wind turbine in 1986; its ﬁrst locally manufactured
wind turbine was built by a Sino-foreign joint venture in 2000. From 1996
to 2005, foreign companies—including Denmark’s Vestas, America’s GE
Energy, and Spain’s Gamesa—dominated China’s domestic wind turbine
market, holding a 75% market share. However, by 2009, Chinese companies,
led by Sinovel and Goldwind, controlled more than two-thirds of the
5. Global Wind Energy Council, Global Wind Statistics 2010, February 2, 2011, <http://dev6.
semaforce.be/ﬁleadmin/documents/Publications/GWEC_PRstats_02-02-2011_ﬁnal.pdf>, accessed
October 28, 2012.

SOURCE :

Global Wind Energy Council, ‘‘Global Wind Statistics 2012,’’ February 11, 2013.

figure 3. Global Top 10 Countries by Cumulative Wind Capacity (December 2012)
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figure 4. Market Share of Domestic and Foreign Wind Turbines in China, by Annual
Installed Capacity (2004–2009)
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Junfeng Li, Pengfei Shi, and Gao Hu, China Wind Power Outlook 2010, China Renewable Energy
Industries Association, Global Wind Energy Council, Greenpeace, October 2010, p. 37, <http://www.
greenpeace.org/eastasia/Global/eastasia/publications/reports/climate-energy/2010/2010-china-wind-poweroutlook.pdf>.

SOURCE :

domestic market share (Figure 4). Foreign companies’ market share has
plummeted to 14%, and they have not won a single central government–
funded wind energy project since 2005. In addition, the emergence of
Chinese companies has reshufﬂed the balance of power among market actors
in the global wind turbine market. China’s largest turbine manufacturer,
Sinovel, established itself as the world’s third-largest turbine producer in
2009. In 2011, the world’s top 10 wind turbine manufacturers accounted for
78.5% of the global market, with the top 4 Chinese companies accounting for
26.7%. How can we explain the breathtaking growth of China as a global
wind power?

OUTSMARTING THE WTO: CHINA AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY

China’s rise as a green power has drawn substantial attention from countries
looking for a way to reinvigorate their industries and governments’ engagement with markets after the severe economic distress of the 2008 global
ﬁnancial crisis. Scholars have long pointed to the signiﬁcance of industrial
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policy, particularly for late developers, as the main tool to move up the global
production ladder.6 This logic also applies to strategic industries like the
green energy sector, where governments intervene to create a comparative
advantage and develop domestic champions for national security and economic reasons. After decades of consensus that industrial policy does not
work for developing nations,7 the World Bank actually began recommending
its use; Justin Lin, a former chief economist at the World Bank, has discussed
the important role government plays in fostering comparative advantage.8
Another economist, Ha-Joon Chang, claims that creating comparative
advantage requires a government to identify winners and encourage the
movement of resources to the industries with the highest growth prospects.9
Vinod Aggarwal and Simon Evenett speciﬁcally demonstrate how the recent
ﬁnancial crisis has prompted China, Korea, and Japan to strategically develop
green industries.10 In fact, the only debatable issue is not whether the state
intervenes, but how the government intervenes and for what purposes. These
newly emerging debates about the use of industrial policies pose a threat to
the liberalizing ideology behind international trade regimes and their ability
to facilitate the liberalization of transitional economies such as China.
China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 seemed to heighten expectations
regarding the effectiveness of international institutions in accelerating
China’s economic liberalization. The WTO creates, monitors, and enforces
trade rules on a multilateral basis, while its Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)
serves as an arena for the resolution of trade disputes.11 By entering the WTO,
China lifted over 7,000 trade-related barriers and revised an additional 2,300
6. Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962).
7. World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993).
8. Justin Y. Lin and Celestin Monga, ‘‘Growth Identiﬁcation and Facilitation: The Role of the
State in the Dynamics of Structural Change,’’ Policy Research Working Paper no. 5313, World Bank,
2011; Justin Y. Lin, Demystifying the Chinese Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
9. Justin Y. Lin and Ha-Joon Chang, ‘‘Should Industrial Policy in Developing Countries
Conform to Comparative Advantage or Defy It? A Debate between Justin Lin and Ha-Joon Chang,’’
Development Policy Review 27:5 (2009), pp. 483–502.
10. Vinod K. Aggarwal and Simon J. Evenett, ‘‘Financial Crisis, ‘New’ Industrial Policy, and the
Bite of Multilateral Trade Rules,’’ Asian Economic Policy Review 5:2 (2010), pp. 221–244.
11. Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, ‘‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism and
Developing Countries,’’ Department for Infrastructure and Economic Cooperation, Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency, 2004; Donald McRae, ‘‘What is the Future of
WTO Dispute Settlement?’’ Journal of International Economic Law 7:1 (2004), pp. 3–6.
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pieces of trade-related legislation from 1999 to 2005. Constructivists emphasize
these developments as evidence of how the socialization of international
institutions has helped China adopt international norms.12
Another group of scholars, including Robert Wade and Linda Weiss,
contend that the very nature of WTO rules places structural limitations on
developing countries like China by restricting the use of industrial policies to
protect infant industries or develop domestic companies at the expense of
foreign companies.13 For example, the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures prohibits popular nontariff barriers such as imposing
requirements on foreign companies regarding local content, export performance, and technology transfer. Meanwhile, other WTO rules permit—or at
least do not explicitly prohibit—the pursuit by advanced countries of morerestrictive industrial policy in technology-intensive industries. Advanced
countries can offer substantial support for venture capital ﬁnancing of
high-tech start-ups, and provide strategic ﬁnancing for precommercial technologies and product development. Thus, Wade and Weiss argue, developed
countries craft WTO rules that best suit their current developmental trajectory, placing developing countries at a systemic disadvantage.
China has certainly played by the international rules and has learned to
engage in the multilateral forum of the WTO, rather than in bilateral retaliatory trade disputes, when it sees the beneﬁts of doing so. As the country
with the world’s highest volume of international trade, China has increasingly
dominated WTO trade dispute settlements. Since joining the WTO, China
has participated in 176 disputes—13 as a complainant, 34 as a respondent, and
129 as a third party. Foreign countries have started relying on the WTO’s
DSB as the main instrument for addressing trade concerns with China, and
China has grown conﬁdent in dealing with trade disputes within the WTO.
Beijing has demonstrated a strong record of compliance with the organization’s dispute-settlement rulings since its entry, when it moved from being
a cautious observer of WTO proceedings to being an active participant; in
12. Ann Kent, ‘‘China’s International Socialization: The Role of International Organizations,’’
Global Governance 8:3 (2002), pp. 343–364; Marcia Don Harpaz, ‘‘Sense and Sensibilities of China
and WTO Dispute Settlement,’’ Journal of World Trade 44:6 (2010), pp. 1155–1186.
13. Robert H. Wade, ‘‘What Strategies Are Viable for Developing Countries Today? The World
Trade Organization and the Shrinking of ‘Development Space,’’’ Review of International Political
Economy 10:4 (2003), pp. 621–644; Linda Weiss, ‘‘Global Governance, National Strategies: How
Industrialized States Make Room to Move under the WTO,’’ Review of International Political
Economy 12:5 (2005), pp. 723–749.
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most cases, Beijing has either reached agreements with the complainant over
the disputed practices or discontinued measures that the WTO found inconsistent with China’s WTO obligations. China’s record at the WTO appears
to conﬁrm international relations and legal studies scholarship regarding
international organizations’ effectiveness in socializing and pressuring China
toward further economic liberalization.
However, China’s achievement in this regard is overshadowed by foreign
governments’ and businesses’ increasing criticism regarding their diminishing
access to the Chinese market, and Beijing’s continuing use of WTOinconsistent industrial policy measures. For foreign businesses, China has
been a ‘‘pay-to-play’’ market with mandated joint venture and localcontent requirements, as well as forced technology transfers in key industries,
which function as the price of market admission.14 At the same time, China
continues to create national champions mainly by developing state-owned
enterprises as the main drivers of economic development and then never fully
privatizing these companies. With state sponsorship, these state-owned enterprises not only block international businesses’ entry into China’s ‘‘pillar’’
industrial sectors, but also bring their inexpensive products and services to
international markets, with a competitive edge over global companies.
Despite expectations that China would abandon its more protective industrial policies after entering the WTO, during the past decade the Chinese
government has increased its reliance on WTO-inconsistent measures as a key
tool for managing the country’s economy. This is especially true since the 2008
ﬁnancial crisis, which led to a severe contraction in China’s export market.
Subsequently, trade disputes involving China have increased at the WTO,
focusing on the issues of subsidies, dumping, favorable treatment of domestic
companies, and discrimination against foreign businesses and imports. In its
report covering 2009–2011, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission frequently criticized China’s restrictions on foreign ﬁrms’ market
access, disregard for intellectual property rights, forced technology transfers,
and the many direct and indirect subsidies to Chinese exporters.15 In its annual
14. James McGregor, ‘‘Time to Rethink U.S.-China Trade Relations’’ Washington Post, May 19,
2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/13/AR2010051303551.
html>, accessed July 6, 2012.
15. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Investment Measures, Subsidies, and
Intellectual Property Protection Which Raise WTO Compliance Concerns, Trade Lawyers Advisory
Group, October 1, 2007; Annual Report to Congress 2010 and 2011, U.S.-China Economic and
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reports from 2010 to 2012, the EU Chamber of Commerce in China outlined
hundreds of protectionist hurdles that still impede foreign businesses.16
The wind turbine industry serves as a representation of China’s use of
industrial policies to develop certain industries at the expense of foreign
companies. In examining the empirical puzzle of China’s continued (and
increased) implementation of industrial policies, along with its ability to ﬂout
international rules, this article argues the following two points. First, under
the WTO system China has room to maneuver to implement WTOinconsistent regulations that protect infant industries, develop strategic
industries, and nurture national champions. China conveniently complies
with WTO dispute rulings when the measures are contested, thereby keeping
its industrial policies one step ahead of the WTO umpire. This is partly
possible because the legal process at the WTO’s DSB takes months or even
years to complete.
Formal WTO dispute settlement has four stages: consultations, panel
proceedings, appellate review, and implementation.17 The process begins
with a written request for consultations by a complaining party; the procedure then grants both sides 60 days to reach a ‘‘mutually satisfactory solution.’’ If these bilateral consultations fail, the complaining party may request
that a panel be established to hear the case. The WTO has up to 45 days to
appoint the panel, which is granted about six months to conclude its investigation. WTO panels take around a year to complete their proceedings and
issue a decision. The disputing parties can then either accept and implement
the panel decision, or they can appeal to the Appellate Body, which may take
up to 90 days to issue its decision. Thus, the total process takes at least a year
without appeal, and a year and half with appeal—and this timetable does not
take into consideration the domestic investigation that leads to the formal
ﬁling at the WTO. Another issue with the WTO’s institutional design is that
DSB rulings are prospective, covering only losses commencing as of the date
of the ruling (alternatively, the date of the ﬁling of a complaint or of the
formation of a panel), not the date of violation.
-

Security Review Commission, <http://origin.www.uscc.gov/Annual_Reports>, accessed September 22,
2012.
16. EU Chamber of Commerce, The European Business in China Position Paper 2010/11, 2011/12,
2012/13.
17. Jeanne J. Grimmett, ‘‘Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization (WTO): An
Overview,’’ Congressional Research Service, April 5, 2012.

OH / HOW CHINA OUTSMARTS THE WTO  1127

These institutional limitations create huge incentives for countries to
initially break WTO rules and resolve any disputed measures only after the
WTO makes a ﬁnal ruling. During this initial period of legal review, countries can beneﬁt from disputed policies and repeal them only once the challenge succeeds. Often, winning a trade dispute depends on more than the
ﬁnal ruling; for example, in China, the real victory can come from buying
time for domestic industry adjustment, as well as signaling its policy preferences to MNCs operating in the country. By navigating through the WTO’s
loopholes, China not only achieves its developmental goals of putting those
measures in place, at least temporarily, but also builds a reputation as
a responsible WTO member that complies with ﬁnal DSB rulings. Thus,
China’s compliance with WTO rulings reﬂects Beijing’s realpolitik calculations. This challenges the conventional wisdom, which states that China’s
compliance reﬂects its socialization to international norms and the effectiveness of WTO’s dispute-settlement process.
Second, I also contend that global supply chain dynamics certainly complicate the issue of initiating trade disputes with China, as well as the interests
of MNCs vis-à-vis Chinese companies. Private parties do not have any standing at the WTO, but they often petition their country’s trade representatives
to bring a dispute and also provide evidence regarding relevant Chinese
government policies. MNCs are typically seen as an export-lobbying group
pressuring China for further liberalization and demanding greater market
access to push values such as free market competition and the rule of law.18
In contrast to this conventional wisdom, however, I argue that MNCs
implicitly or explicitly support protectionist measures in China due to either
their fear of retribution from Chinese government ofﬁcials, or their hope to
gain even small pieces of the ever-enlarging pie of the Chinese economy. Fear
of Chinese government retribution prevents MNCs from contesting Chinese
behavior or bringing evidence to support cases at the WTO. Chinese ofﬁcials
can ﬂex their muscles through measures such as blocking an MNC’s entrance
into the Chinese market, delaying permits, withholding raw materials, and
detaining ﬁnished products at ports. Ofﬁcials at the Ofﬁce of the United
States Trade Representative frequently complain that most US companies are
18. Jeffry Frieden, ‘‘Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of
Global Finance,’’ International Organization 45:4 (1991), pp. 425–451; Helen Milner, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).
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unwilling to ﬁle formal complaints because they fear Chinese retaliation—
they will share information about Chinese rule-breaking practices only privately.19 In the recent WTO case involving the Chinese dumping of solar
panels in the US market, SolarWorld Industries America was the only company willing to publicly support the case; the six other companies involved
chose to remain anonymous. When problems arise, individual companies
and industries are forced to choose between tacitly accommodating them and
squaring off against various levels of the Chinese government.
MNCs are not always a unitary economic actor pressuring China to live up
to its promises. First, global supply chain dynamics complicate the domestic
political payoff of contesting Chinese measures at the WTO. While some
economic actors within home countries beneﬁt from inexpensive Chinese
products, others are hurt by them. In America’s solar panel dispute with
China, the parties that beneﬁt from cheap Chinese imports, such as panel
installers and individual consumers, have opposed opening the dispute case at
the WTO; solar panel producers, on the other hand, have pressured the US
government to initiate a trade dispute. Second, foreign businesses have
diverging interests, depending on whether they already have investments or
contracts with China.20 Business interest groups that do not have direct
investments in China tend to make dispute cases proactively. Ultimately,
China’s pattern of compliance with DSB rulings is facilitated not only by
the WTO’s bureaucratic legal process of dispute settlement, but also by the
MNCs’ diverging interests in China.

EXPLAINING THE RAPID RISE OF CHINA AS A GLOBAL
GREEN POWER

In an effort to establish China’s behavior in multilateral and bilateral trade
disputes, I examine China’s WTO trade dispute regarding its Special Fund
for Wind Power Equipment Manufacturing and its bilateral disputes with the
US regarding anti-dumping (AD) measures and countervailing duties (CVD)
on imports of wind towers from China. The WTO case started in 2010, when
19. Ofﬁce of the United States Trade Representative, USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO
Compliance, December 2010, <http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2596>, accessed on July 22, 2012.
20. Seung-Youn Oh, ‘‘Fragmented Liberalization in the Chinese Automotive Industry: The
Political Logic behind Beijing Hyundai’s Success in the Chinese Market,’’ China Quarterly 216
(2013), pp. 920–945.
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the US and the EU contested China’s subsidies for domestic wind turbine
manufacturers that used domestic rather than imported goods. The US–
China bilateral trade dispute started in late 2011, when four US wind component companies ﬁled a petition to the US Department of Commerce.
I chose the wind turbine industry as an indicative example of how various
levels of the Chinese government provide strategic support, without being
constrained by the WTO rules, to promote national and regional champions.
With its ﬁrst installment of an imported utility-scale wind turbine in 1986,
China started developing its wind industry sector. Until the early 2000s,
China mostly focused on producing noncommercial wind turbines that were
supported with government subsidies; it did not intend to strategically
develop domestic manufacturers. Thus, domestic manufacturers of wind
power equipment were not signiﬁcant in the Chinese domestic market before
2000 and held a market share of less than 10%. Beginning in 2003, Beijing
placed a strategic emphasis on the development of renewable energy, including the wind industry, as a response to the need for greater energy independence, environmental protection, and industrial upgrades. First, the central
government created incentives for the development of wind farms and
domestic wind turbine makers by granting provincial governments the right
to approve wind power projects of less than 50 megawatts (MW). Second, the
Chinese government manipulated local-content requirements to nurture
national champions and promote industrial capacity-building for indigenous
ﬁrms. In 1997, China’s top economic planning agency at the time, the State
Development and Planning Commission, started its Ride the Wind Program,
and promoted local capacity-building within joint venture enterprises. In this
program, Beijing required joint ventures to meet a 20% local-content
requirement, with a goal of increasing that value to 80% as domestic producers built up their technological capabilities. In 2003, the National Development and Reform Commission (which succeeded the State Development and
Planning Commission) quietly increased the local-content requirement on
wind turbines to 50% and ﬁnally to 70%, while also substantially hiking
tariffs on imported components. From 2003 to 2007, to provide stronger
incentives for foreign companies to utilize domestic parts, the government
organized ﬁve rounds of bidding competitions for national wind power
projects totaling more than 3 GW capacity. These wind resource concessions
drove rapid wind energy development during these years. As the Chinese
market for wind turbines exploded, foreign manufacturers were unable to
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expand their supply chains quickly enough to meet the increased demand.
Thus, they were left with no choice but to establish manufacturing facilities
in China.
China’s adoption of the Renewable Energy Law in 2005 marked the
beginning of exponential growth in the country’s wind energy sector, and
started to threaten foreign producers’ dominance over the deployment of ongrid wind capacity. The law created a framework for regulating renewable
energy—establishing a national target for production, a mandatory connection and purchase policy, a feed-in tariff system, and a cost-sharing mechanism. Most importantly, the law dramatically increased government subsidies
for wind energy projects by Chinese-owned domestic enterprises. This development enabled dozens of local companies to pick up the slack in the wind
energy market share rapidly and cost-effectively, mainly through licensing
technology from small European turbine producers. For example, Goldwind’s licensing arrangements with Repower, a German company, provided
enough knowledge for Goldwind to jump into the wind turbine industry and
innovate by using the transferred technology.21 China’s 2007 Foreign Investment Industry Guidance Catalogue promoted opportunities for foreign ﬁrms
to invest in the country’s wind turbine manufacturing sector. At the same
time, however, foreign involvement in the manufacturing of wind turbines
with greater than 1.5 MW capacity in China was restricted to joint ventures or
partnerships, to promote the upgrading of domestic wind turbine
capabilities.
In 2008, the Chinese government modiﬁed its subsidies framework by
creating the Wind Base Program, which was designed to accelerate the shift
away from joint ventures and create greater domestic capacity to build large
wind turbine components. The program strongly boosted the development of
the wind power industry in China, establishing positive market conditions for
domestic wind turbine manufacturers and leading to the creation of seven 10
GW wind bases around the country. Additionally, domestic enterprises that
import core components or materials for such systems were granted import
tariff and value-added tax rebates, contingent on documentation of R&D
activity, knowledge transfer, and employment of skilled Chinese workers.
21. Joanna I. Lewis, ‘‘Technology Acquisition and Innovation in the Developing World: Wind
Turbine Development in China and India,’’ Studies in Comparative International Development 42:3–4
(2007), pp. 208–232.
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Technology transfers—established through required local-content regulations, government subsidies, preferential tax policies, and preferential
treatment in project tendering and bidding—have fueled the rapid growth
of China’s domestic wind turbine companies in both Chinese and global
markets.22 In the Chinese domestic wind turbine market, foreign companies held 75% of market share from 1996 to 2005. In 2004, China had only
eight small domestic companies manufacturing turbines, and the market for
component suppliers was just beginning to emerge. However, by the end of
2007, there were 40 domestic turbine manufacturers in China, 20 of which
already had products on the market; by the end of 2009, there were over 70
domestic turbine manufacturers, 30 of which had products on the market
and had captured two-thirds of the country’s wind turbine market.23 The
average size of the wind turbine generating systems produced by Chinese
companies increased very quickly as well, from 0.43 MW in 2002 to 0.66
MW in 2005, and eventually to 1.55 MW in 2011.24
The entry of China’s national and regional champions into the world wind
energy market signiﬁcantly weakened traditional market leaders. In 2005,
companies from northern Europe and the US dominated the world wind
turbine market, with four companies producing more than 75% of the
world’s large wind turbine generation systems—Denmark’s Vestas (34.1%),
Spain’s Gamesa (18.1%), Germany’s Enercon (15.8%), and America’s GE
Wind (11%).25 However, in 2008, three Chinese companies were featured
in the list of the world’s top 10 wind turbine manufacturers. Figures for newly
installed wind turbine systems in 2009 further conﬁrmed the rise of Chinese
companies in the global market: the traditional four European and American
market leaders’ combined market share fell to 47%, while emerging enterprises such as Sinovel and Goldwind from China captured a 30% share.26
22. Joanna I. Lewis, Green Innovation in China: China’s Wind Power Industry and the Global
Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
23. Global Wind Energy Council, The Development of Wind Power Tariffs in China, 2010.
24. Jialu Liu and Don Goldstein, ‘‘Understanding China’s Renewable Energy Technology
Exports,’’ Energy Policy 52 (2013), p. 420.
25. Alasdair Cameron, ‘‘Steady as She Goes: BTM’s World Market Update,’’ Renewable Energy
World 8:4 (2005).
26. Junfeng Li, Pengfei Shi, and Gao Hu, China Wind Power Outlook 2010, China Renewable
Energy Industries Association, Global Wind Energy Council, Greenpeace, October, 2010, <http://
www.greenpeace.org/eastasia/Global/eastasia/publications/reports/climate-energy/2010/2010-chinawind-power-outlook.pdf>.
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figure 5. Market Share of Global Top 10 Wind Turbine Manufacturers
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Compiled by the author from various sources including World Wind Energy Association,
‘‘Acquisition of Repower by Suzlon is Important Step in International Cooperation,’’ 2007, http://www.
wwindea.org/home/index.php?option¼com_content&task¼view&id¼175&Itemid¼40; BTM Consult,
‘‘World Market Update,’’ March 2010, http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20110328006651/en/
BTM-Consult-Releases-Wind-Report-World-Market; BTM Consult, International Wind Energy
Development Market 2010, March 2011, http://www.navigant.com/*/media/WWW/site/downloads/
energy/world_market_update_2010.ashx/; Junfeng Li et al., China Wind Power Outlook 2010, China
Renewable Energy Industries Association, http://gwec.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/wind-report0919.
pdf; Global Wind Energy Council, Global Wind Statistics 2010, February 2, 2011, http://dev6.semaforce.
be/fileadmin/documents/Publications/GWEC_PRstats_02-02-2011_final.pdf; ‘‘Wind Turbine
Manufacturers: Global Market Shares,’’ Cleantech Magazine 6, no. 2 (2012), http://www.cleantechinvestor.
com/portal/wind-energy/10502-wind-turbine-manufacturers-global-market-shares.html.

As Figure 5 suggests, Sinovel and Goldwind’s combined global market share
grew from 3% in 2006 to over 20% in 2010. This is a breathtaking achievement given that prior to 2005, there was only one Chinese company among
the top 15 global manufacturers.
The wind power industry is just one sectoral example of China’s developmental pattern of regulating foreign competitors with mandated joint ventures, local-content requirements, and forced technology transfers, while also
providing state support to national champions to help them compete in the
global market. This arrangement repeats itself in other sectors, such as in
China’s high-speed railway and solar energy industries. With the high-speed
railway system, the Chinese national railway company received most of the
state-sponsored contracts. From 2003 to the end of the 11th Five-Year Plan
(2006–2010), the Chinese government approved more than CNY 4 trillion
in investment for railway construction. As a result, Chinese companies
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triumphed over foreign competitors, who had controlled two-thirds of the
Chinese high-speed rail market in the early 2000s, including France’s Alstom,
Japan’s Kawasaki, and Germany’s Siemens. In the international solar energy
industry, China has emerged as the world’s leading supplier of solar modules,
surpassing Japanese and German solar cell and module vendors. Currently,
Chinese ﬁrms produce 65% of solar panels worldwide and account for nine of
the world’s top 10 solar panel producers.27 According to Milan Nitzschke,
a vice president at SolarWorld, ‘‘Chinese companies have captured over 80%
of the EU market for solar products from virtually zero only a few years ago.’’
He claims that ‘‘EU manufacturers have the world’s best solar technologies,
but are beaten in their home market due to illegal dumping of Chinese solar
products below their cost of production.’’28

GONE WITH THE WIND: TRADE DISPUTES OVER CHINA’S
WIND POWER

China’s strategy for developing the wind power sector has not only portended
the comeback of state capitalism, but also created increasing trade tensions
with other countries in bilateral and multilateral settings. The WTO trade
dispute regarding China’s wind sector stemmed from a 5,800-page petition
that the United Steelworkers union ﬁled with the Ofﬁce of the United States
Trade Representative in September 2010. The petition claimed that China
was employing a wide range of policies that were inconsistent with WTO
principles and that unfairly supported domestic producers of green energy
technology—including wind and solar energy products, advanced batteries,
and energy-efﬁcient vehicles.29 The Ofﬁce of the United States Trade Representative proceeded with an investigation in October 2010, ultimately
deciding to only challenge China’s Special Fund for Wind Power Equipment

27. Ehren Grossens, ‘‘The Downside of China’s Clean Energy Push,’’ Bloomberg Businessweek,
November 21, 2012.
28. ‘‘Solar Trade Complaint Filed against the Chinese, This Time in Europe,’’ SustainableBusiness.
com News, July 27, 2012, <http://www.sustainablebusiness.com/index.cfm/go/news.display/id/23909>,
accessed October 8, 2012.
29. Ofﬁce of the United States Trade Representative, ‘‘United States Launches Section 301
Investigation into China’s Policies Affecting Trade and Investment in Green Technologies,’’
October 2010, <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-ofﬁces/press-ofﬁce/press-releases/2010/october/
united-states-launches-section-301-investigation-c>.
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Manufacturing (hereafter, Special Fund) at the WTO by ﬁling a request for
consultations in December 2010.
The US held its WTO-mediated consultations with China in February
2011. During those sessions, the US stated that Chinese subsidies to domestic
manufacturers under the Special Fund program violated Article 3 of the
WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (‘‘Prohibited
Subsidies’’), which prohibits WTO members from granting subsidies that are
contingent on export performance or on the use of domestic instead of
imported goods. The WTO’s Trade-Related Investment Measures also prohibit member countries from imposing performance requirements or implementing non-tariff barriers, such as export subsidies and local-content
requirements, on foreign investors. Despite these legal restrictions under the
WTO, China’s Special Fund promoted the use of domestic goods over the
purchase of imported goods by offering grants (ranging from $6.7 million to
$22.5 million) to Chinese wind turbine manufacturers that agreed to use key
parts and components made in China. Consequently, domestic brands of
wind turbines are 10% cheaper in China than domestically made foreign
brands, and 20% cheaper than imports. The US trade representatives also
attacked China’s Special Fund and the general use of subsidies on
transparency-related grounds: China has submitted only one subsidy notiﬁcation to the WTO since 2001, and never ofﬁcially notiﬁed the WTO of the
existence of the Special Fund. China’s actions violated Article 25 of the
WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (‘‘Notiﬁcation’’) regarding members’ obligation to submit information on all of their
subsidy programs on a regular basis (every two years). Beijing’s much-delayed
report on subsidy programs, submitted in April 2006, covered only national
subsidies and excluded sub-national programs, despite its clear obligations to
include them. China has also failed to translate program speciﬁcs from Chinese into any of the three ofﬁcial WTO languages (English, French, and
Spanish).
In a Chinese Ministry of Commerce press release that responded to the US
criticism, China defended the subsidies by citing environmental concerns
and the need to decrease emissions.30 Beijing claims that its investments in
30. Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, ‘‘Commerce Department of Treaty
and Law Department Is Responsible for the United States in the WTO on the Chinese Wind Energy
Measures Issued a Statement Filed the Request for Consultations,’’ December 23, 2010, <http://
www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ae/ai/201012/20101207325758.html>.
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table 1. Proceedings of China’s Fund for Domestic Wind Turbine Makers
Stage

Year

Date

Procedures

Pre-litigation

2010

Sept. 9

The United Steelworkers Union petitions the US
government to investigate China’s prohibitive
government incentives for domestic wind power
equipment manufacturers under Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974

Oct. 15

Office of the United States Trade Representative launches
an investigation in response to the petition

2010

Dec. 22

The US files a request for consultations regarding import
substitution subsidies under the PRC Special Fund for
Wind Power Manufacturing Program

2011

Jan. 1

The EU requests to join consultations

Jan. 17

Japan requests to join consultations

Feb. 16

The US holds WTO-mediated consultations with China

June 7

The US announces that China has terminated the Special
Fund, but transparency concerns related to China’s
bidding process remain unresolved

Consultation

Implementation

2011

green energy beneﬁt not only China but also the global environment, especially as China became the world’s largest producer of greenhouse gas emissions in 2006. However, this argument does not adequately explain why these
subsidies are not available to all companies operating in China, regardless
of national origin. Following the WTO consultations, China in June 2011
resorted to rescinding the legal measure that had created the Special Fund
program (Table 1), and removed some of the barriers on foreign businesses.
For example, foreign developers with overseas experience in wind farm development can now seek to build offshore wind farms in China. They were
previously banned from these projects on the grounds of national security.
To what extent does China’s compliance with WTO rulings affect the
pattern of competition in the wind power market? In the years leading up to
the WTO’s formal consultations with China in 2011, China’s wind industry
continued to grow, as shown by how its installed capacity quickly surpassed
that of any other country in the world. China’s manufacturers have had
ample time to scale up production to compete with established companies,
and have controlled more than two-thirds of the Chinese domestic market
since 2009 (Table 2). In 2009, the European Union Chamber of Commerce
in China criticized Chinese government tenders in the wind power sector for
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including criteria that only Chinese companies could meet and thereby
purposely excluding foreign bidders. It also pointed out that none of the 25
most valuable contracts under the government’s $584 billion stimulus package was awarded to a foreign company.31 In 2010, nondomestic manufacturers’ market share in China had diminished. Vestas’s share of the Chinese
market is tiny (4.9%) when compared with its dominance in Sweden (54.3%)
and England (38%).32 Moreover, Chinese players can now independently
manufacture—and, in fact, dominate the market for—1.5 MW wind turbines, the main size installed on today’s wind farms. In general, China only
complies with the WTO rulings when that is convenient, and thus beneﬁts
from anticompetitive behavior while avoiding many negative consequences.
By the time China removes measures that are contested at the WTO, it has
already achieved its goal of putting its desired industrial policy measures in
place during the most strategically important periods of development. In this
way, Chinese industrial policy outfoxes WTO rulings.
Foreign businesses’ concerns are not limited to their diminishing access to
the Chinese market—they also face increasing competition with Chinese
companies in the global market. With state sponsorship, Chinese national
champions have recently begun dominating the global wind turbine industry.
In 2011, the world’s top 10 wind turbine manufacturers accounted for 78.5%
of the global market, with four Chinese companies accounting for 26.7%,
including Sinovel (no. 2) and Goldwind (no. 3—see Table 3). In competition
with MNCs, Chinese companies have dramatically expanded their capacity
to manufacture alternative energy technologies. In 2011, Goldwind and Sinovel alone secured €8.7 billion (USD 11.6 billion) in overseas expansion
funding from the China Development Bank, while the European Investment
Bank, hampered by the European debt crisis, could only provide €6.2 billion
(USD 8.69 billion) in funding for all renewable energy projects in the EU.33
In April 2011, Sinovel signed an agreement with the Greek Public Power
31. Malcolm Moore, ‘‘China Closes Doors to European Businesses,’’ The Telegraph, September 2,
2009, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ﬁnance/china-business/6124973/China-closes-doors-toEuropean-businesses.html>, accessed October 2, 2012.
32. AOL Energy, ‘‘Wind Rush 2012: An AOL Energy White Paper,’’ March 2012, <http://
breakingenergy.sites.breakingmedia.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2012/03/Wind_Rush_White_
Paper_AolEnergy.pdf>, accessed September 21, 2012.
33. Felicity Carus, ‘‘Wind Rush: Asian Typhoon Hits Debt-Crisis Europe,’’ Breaking Energy,
November 15, 2011, <http://breakingenergy.com/2011/11/15/wind-rush-asian-typhoon-hits-debtcrisis-europe/>, accessed October 2, 2012.
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table 4. Proceedings of CVD and AD Investigations
Event

AD investigation

Petition filed

December 29, 2011

Department of Commerce initiation

January 18 2012

International Trade Commission preliminary
determination

February 13, 2012

Department of Commerce preliminary determination

July 26, 2012

Department of Commerce final determination

December 17, 2012

International Trade Commission final determination

January 31, 2013

Issuance of order

February 7, 2013

CVD investigation

May 29, 2012

SOURCE :

US Department of Commerce, ‘‘Fact Sheet: Commerce Finds Dumping and Subsidization of
Imports of Utility Scale Wind Towers from the People’s Republic of China (China) and Dumping of
Imports of Utility Scale Wind Towers from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Vietnam),’’ December 18,
2012, <http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/factsheets/factsheet_china-vietnam-uswt-adcvd-final-20121218.pdf>.

Corporation to supply up to 300 MW of onshore capacity in Greece, with the
potential for additional offshore development.34
Lastly, Chinese companies also ﬂood foreign markets with inexpensive
products, fueling more trade tensions. The US–China bilateral trade dispute
surrounding the Chinese wind industry came to a head on December 29,
2011, when four US wind component companies formed the Wind Tower
Trade Coalition and ﬁled a petition asking the US Department of Commerce
to initiate AD and CVD investigations of imports of utility-scale wind towers
from China (as well as Vietnam). In 2011, the US imported $222 million worth
of utility-scale wind towers from China. In its petition, the trade coalition listed
nearly 40 separate Chinese subsidy and assistance programs—ranging from
cash grants and subsidized steel to tax breaks—that allegedly allowed Chinese
wind tower manufacturers to engage in predatory pricing in the US.
The Commerce Department announced in January 2012 that it had initiated
AD and CVD investigations regarding certain Chinese programs listed in the
Wind Tower Trade Coalition’s petition (but not others). The list of claims
being investigated included cash grants, cheap raw materials, free land, electricity, preferential loans and credit, and tax exemptions (Table 4). In December 2012, the department concluded its AD investigation and announced that it
had determined that Chinese producers had sold utility-scale wind towers in
34. AOL Energy, ‘‘Wind Rush 2012.’’
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the US at dumping margins of 44.99–70.63%. It set ﬁnal dumping margins of
47.59% on wind towers from Chengxi Shipyard and 44.99% for Titan Wind
Energy.
In its CVD investigation, meanwhile, the department set anti-subsidy
duties of 21.86% for CS Wind China and 34.81% for Titan Wind Energy.35
The dumping rates in cases like this one, however, are applied speciﬁcally to
companies that are hurting the US with their imports. Therefore, in this
context, a WTO ruling has one big advantage over bilateral AD and CVD
rulings: the WTO ﬁling can work toward removing policies that distort trade
worldwide, while bilateral AD and CVD rulings only protect one country’s
home market.
Diverging interests among foreign companies in complainant countries
further complicate trade-dispute processes. For the trade dispute in the wind
sector, many wind companies did not support the petitions of the US Commerce Department because they feared revenge from Chinese partners or
losing economic gains in their business deals with China. Immediately after
United Steelworkers ﬁled its complaint, the American Wind Energy Association cited the lack of sufﬁcient renewable energy policy support in the US,
rather than China’s illegal subsidies, as the primary problem facing the US
wind energy industry. The US solar energy industry, on the other hand, has
articulated several complaints about Chinese practices. In October 2011, the
Coalition for American Solar Manufacturing—a trade group representing
solar panel manufacturers—ﬁled a petition with the Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission that challenged China’s
illegal subsidies to solar companies. The group has called for tariffs of more
than 100% on imports of Chinese solar panels, which had pushed prices
down from $3.30 per watt in 2008 to as low as $1 per watt in 2011. At the
same time, however, the Coalition for Affordable Solar Energy, which consists of 25 US companies that purchase and install solar panels, opposed tariffs
that would increase the price of modules and therefore the price of solar
energy, saying that such a strategy would undermine the success of the US
solar industry and prolong US reliance on fossil fuels.36
35. US Department of Commerce, ‘‘Commerce Finds Dumping and Subsidization of Imports of
Utility Scale Wind Towers from the People’s Republic of China and Dumping of Imports of Utility
Scale Wind Towers from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,’’ December 18, 2012.
36. Zachary Shahan, ‘‘Chinese Solar Cells & Panels Get Low U.S. Tariff, & U.S. Solar Energy
Industries Association Responds,’’ Clean Technica, March 20, 2012, <http://cleantechnica.com/2012/
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As illustrated above, China’s pattern of convenient compliance allows
Beijing not only to achieve its economic developmental goals through measures that ﬂout WTO rules, but also to improve its reputation as a responsible
member of the international community. Contrary to Wade and Weiss’s
concerns about the WTO working to restrict the trade policies of developing
countries, China still has a lot of room to maneuver under WTO rules.

THE TRUE COST OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY

China’s various uses of industrial policy have been key to the exponential
growth of the country’s wind energy industry. However, heavy government
involvement often distorts market incentives and dampens market competition, eventually hampering the sustainable growth of an industry. First of all,
the Chinese government’s strategic focus on certain sectors creates incentives
for local governments and Chinese companies to swarm into the
government-supported sectors. This in turn creates quantitative growth at
the expense of quality, setting the negative spiral effect in motion—leading to
widespread overcapacity, heated price competition, squeezed proﬁt margins,
sectoral fragmentation, and large numbers of bankruptcies.
The wind power sector is no exception. In 2003, to encourage local governments to create economic actors in the wind energy sector, Beijing granted
these governments the right to approve wind farms smaller than 50 MW.
According to Lu Hong, a renewable energy expert at the Energy Foundation’s
Beijing ofﬁce, this arrangement created a phenomenon of ‘‘49.5 MW wind
farms,’’ where wind farm developers built many wind farms with a capacity
slightly below 50 MW with the support of the local government; this was
a ploy to avoid having to obtain approval from the central government.37 As
of July 2011, local governments in China had approved more than 90% of all
wind farm proposals.38 Such dramatic quantitative growth led to over-supply
and over-competition, which was followed by bruising price wars among
-

03/20/chinese-solar-cells-panels-get-low-u-s-tariff-u-s-solar-energy-industries-association-responds/>,
accessed October 5, 2012.
37. Coco Liu, ‘‘Grid Problems Steer China’s Huge Wind Power Industry into Financial Doldrums,’’ Environment & Energy Publishing, May 25, 2012, <http://www.eenews.net/stories/
1059964937>, accessed May 18, 2013.
38. Junfeng Li et al., China Wind Power Outlook 2012, China Renewable Energy Industries
Association, November 2012, p. 59, <http://www.gwec.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/ChinaOutlook-2012-EN.pdf>, accessed on December 29, 2013.
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figure 6. Wind Turbine Price Change
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SOURCE : Joanna I. Lewis, Green Innovation in China: China’s Wind Power Industry and the Global
Transition to a Low-carbon Economy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), p. 66.

Chinese producers and decreasing proﬁt margins. Average turbine prices in
China declined by 17% between June 2010 and June 2011, culminating in
a price of roughly RMB 3.77 million (USD 590,000) per MW.39 Even the
market leader, Sinovel, reported a 73% decrease in proﬁts in 2011; another
market leader, Goldwind, earned about one-quarter less income than in the
previous year.40 Price reductions have cut into proﬁt margins and R&D
investment among Chinese turbine makers and component manufacturers,
laying the basis for serious structural problems in terms of long-term development (Figure 6).
The discrepancy between the growth in demand and supply in China’s
wind energy sector has aggravated market conditions. Besides the problem on
the wind energy supply side, market demand and grid installation have not
kept up with the pace at which new wind farms have opened. At its peak,
China’s installed wind energy capacity more than doubled each year from
2005 to 2010 (as shown in Figure 1), and demand for turbines consequently
skyrocketed. However, by 2011, installation slowed, and demand for new
turbines actually dipped below levels from the previous year for the ﬁrst time
(although China was nonetheless still the world’s biggest market, installing
39. AOL Energy, ‘‘Wind Rush 2012.’’
40. A Greener Shade of Grey.
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nearly half of all new wind towers erected in 2011). In addition, 28% of
turbines in China did not even have a connection to the grid at the end of
2011. State Grid, China’s dominant electricity utility company, dislikes wind
energy because of its high costs and the instability of the electricity network.
In the ﬁrst half of 2011, three wind farms suffered outages that affected nearly
2,000 turbines, which raised concerns among leaders in Beijing.
Concerned about the health of the wind sector, the central government
started to bring the industry more tightly under its own control and shift the
focus from quantitative to qualitative growth.41 In August 2009, the State
Council listed wind turbine production as an ‘‘excess capacity sector,’’ leading
to the Ministry of Land and Resources reportedly denying all applications for
new wind turbine manufacturing facilities in an effort to slow growth. The
National Energy Administration also issued a series of industry management
standards and technical requirements in July 2011 that were intended to
strengthen wind farm construction planning and management. For example,
the administration issued the ‘‘Notice on the Planning and Arrangement of
the First Group of Tentatively Approved Wind Power Projects for the 12th
Five-Year Plan Period,’’ which stated that projects not already listed as
approved could not be approved. While the lower tiers of government retain
their rights to approve wind power projects with a capacity below 50 MW,
the central government has for the ﬁrst time capped the total amount of wind
power capacity that each region can approve. Any projects that exceed the cap
will not be allowed to connect to power grids, let alone sell electricity at
government-subsidized prices.
This negative chain reaction from heavy state-led industry development can
be found in several different sectors in China. The solar industry has followed
a similar path: solar module prices dropped 47% in 2012, and debt-to-equity
ratios at Chinese solar ﬁrms are nearly 80%, as opposed to 50%, which is the
typical value for global companies.42 No example better epitomizes the problem of over-capacity than Suntech Power, the world’s largest solar panel maker,
which ﬁled for bankruptcy in the eastern city of Wuxi in early 2013.43 Suntech’s
41. This information came from Dong Luying, an associate professor at the Energy Research
Institute at the National Development and Reform Commission. Coco Liu, ‘‘Grid Problems.’’
42. ‘‘Sunset for Suntech: The Troubling Bankruptcy in a Troubled Business,’’ The Economist,
March 30, 2013, <http://www.economist.com/news/business/21574534-troubling-bankruptcytroubled-business-sunset-suntech>, accessed on April 7, 2013.
43. Junfeng Li et al., China Wind Power Outlook 2012.
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debt had swelled from USD 841 million in 2007 to almost USD 2.3 billion in
2011.44 Certainly, the sector-speciﬁc factor of the worldwide plunge in solar
panel prices affected Suntech’s bankruptcy ﬁling, but the stories of overcapacity, fragmentation, and over-competition are nothing new in China, and
are often seen in other sectors, such as in the automotive and wind turbine
industries.
CONCLUSION

Following the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis, debates about the potential merits
of industrial policy intensiﬁed within policy and academic circles, as governments of both developed and developing countries urgently searched for new
ways to increase growth and employment. The stark contrast between the
economic woes of the liberal market economies in Europe and America, and
the relatively thriving economies in state-centric countries like China, has
drawn attention to China’s newly reinvigorated industrial policies, as well as
to the potential return of state capitalism.
Through a case study of the wind turbine sector and related trade tensions,
this article has offered explanations on how China’s industrial policy functions as a double-edged sword. During its 15 years of WTO membership,
China has certainly learned how to play by the rules through its socialization
into WTO norms, but it has also learned how to keep its industrial policies
one step ahead of the WTO umpire through convenient compliance. China
often uses protective industrial policy measures to achieve its developmental
goals. Then, it opportunely complies with the WTO’s DSB rulings after the
measures are no longer needed, thereby developing a reputation as a responsible WTO member. For developing countries like China, the primary goal
of compliance with the WTO mediation process is to win time for domestic
industry adjustments, and to signal policy preferences to domestic and foreign businesses operating in China; thus, the ﬁnal trade dispute ruling is
rendered mostly irrelevant. Through this strategy, China has not only been
able to develop Chinese national champions that can compete in domestic
and global markets, but has also provided incentives for multinational companies to become a part of China’s protectionism.
44. ‘‘The Man at the Center of Solar-Panel Maker Suntech’s Fall,’’ Wall Street Journal, May 3, 2013,
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324743704578442422720766046.html>, accessed on
May 14, 2013.
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Important systemic issues emerge when a large transitional economy like
China outruns the WTO system—not only for the WTO, but also for the
free market. First, countries are increasingly resorting to the WTO’s DSB as
the main instrument to address bilateral trade disputes in multilateral settings, because bilateral disputes between countries tend to spiral into retaliatory trade wars. And just as foreign countries have increasingly relied on the
DSB as the main instrument for addressing trade concerns with China,
China has grown increasingly conﬁdent in dealing with trade disputes within
the WTO. Between its accession to the WTO in 2001 and the end of 2005,
China was a party to only two of the 93 trade disputes at the WTO. However,
by the end of 2015, China is a party to 49 ongoing trade-dispute cases ﬁled
with the organization (15 as complainant and 34 as respondent).
Second, due to the failed Doha round of WTO negotiations during the
past decade, global economic and trade liberalization have slowed on account
of increasing litigation and disputes over WTO rules. We have also witnessed
a parallel rise in trade tensions among countries due to increasing governmental intervention across various sectors in the wake of the global ﬁnancial
crisis. Setting aside the counterfactual claim that protectionism would have
been worse during the crisis in the absence of WTO rules, states have often
deliberately attempted to circumvent existing multilateral trade rules during
the past six years. Thus, when a country such as China games the system and
exploits the institutional limitations of the WTO, interesting questions arise
regarding who is socializing whom, and who is limiting whom, in the relationship between the WTO and China. This set of developments challenges
the conventional wisdom regarding the effectiveness of international organizations in socializing China into international norms.

